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Abstract 
The blockchain technology challenges the view on established modes of governance by 
offering distributed authentication without the need for a central authority, which is 
well-exemplified by Bitcoin. While the governance of and through Bitcoin is well-
accentuated in research, we spotlight impacts on governance which blockchain-based 
systems bring to inter-organizational settings as well as their purpose. To build our 
arguments, we explore those impacts on two contrasting cases from the domains of 
automotive and public administration and relate them to cryptocurrencies. Relying on 
interviews with experts from said organizations utilizing blockchain technology, and a 
content analysis of related grey literature, we discuss established forms of governance 
as well as platforms and infrastructures against the impacts which blockchain-based 
systems cause. After referring those to the concepts of markets, hierarchies, networks, 
and tribes, we critically reflect on their purpose by utilizing the notions of 
infrastructures and platforms, and conclude blockchain-based systems to possibly alter 
the way established modes of governance are enacted. 
Keywords:  Blockchain Governance, Inter-organizational Systems, Distributed Ledger 
Technology Governance, Distributed Authentication, Consortia Blockchain 
Introduction 
Ruling with many rulers is not easy. Ruling without rulers is a paradox in theory with interesting 
consequences in practice. Both stances manifest in the emerging problems of governance regarding 
blockchain-based systems. Bitcoin, born at the time of a major financial crisis and the most prominent 
blockchain to date, proved at scale the technical functioning of this distributed consensus system.  
However, it also continues to show the shortcomings of its mode of governance, which refrain from formal 
and central authorities. The maintenance of the public ledger of all Bitcoin transactions relies on 
distributed mining, which substitutes external authorities acting as intermediates, often depicted as 
expensive and prone to corruption. In other words, trust is promised to be maintained by a cheaper 
 Exploring Blockchain Governance across inter-organizational Settings 
  
 Thirty Ninth International Conference on Information Systems, San Francisco 2018 2 
system which leaves little space to political maneuvering. This is proving questionable. We explore this 
and related issues in practice by considering several different implementations of blockchains. 
Despite its growth, due to substantive inflow of capital in recent years, Bitcoin’s peculiar governance 
proved troublesome: Bitcoin’s decade long history is defined by constant crises (De Filippi and Loveluck 
2016), particularly in relation to never-ending conflicts on core technical decisions with far-fetched 
consequences. Those problems put repeatedly Bitcoin on the verge of a stand-still if not collapse (De 
Filippi and Loveluck 2016), and arguably hindered a number of innovations like micro-payments.  
Those remarkable set-backs did not hurt the great deal of enthusiasm that persists around blockchains. 
This can be best exemplified by the so-called decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs: Self-
organized communities whose operation is set in code) as three projects alone (Tezos, Aragon, TheDAO) 
gathered hundreds of millions USD in funds just to run in governance problems shortly after (DuPont 
2017; Floyd 2018). Hence, the hype that blockchain solutions come wrapped in may not predict how they 
will develop in practice but it explains what stakeholders mobilize resources, how they use them, and with 
what expectations, which is consistent with the concept of the organizing vision proposed by Swanson and 
Ramiller (1997). Therefore,  most of our data collection relied on interviews with key figures in their 
respective companies. For the time being, we have no way, nor it is our intention with this paper, to enter 
the prediction game. Rather, we use those cases to distill insights into if and how blockchains impact 
governance in inter-organizational settings.  
This research has an exploratory character and is inspired by the call for a deeper understanding on how 
blockchain systems can be utilized and what impacts on governance they cause (Beck et al. 2018; Tapscott 
and Tapscott 2017). We understand governance as the means for organizational and economic 
coordination utilizing decision rights, incentives, and accountabilities (Beck et al. 2018); we study and 
contrast the governance of (system governance) and through (brought by the system) blockchains.  
In sum, the aim of this paper is to contribute to the scarce body of knowledge on governance in and 
around blockchain-based systems, which targets a vibrant and growing debate in academia and 
practitioners’. To achieve that purpose, thus improve also the practice of governance in different domains, 
we reviewed a large amount of grey literature (authoritative and specialized news, blogs, articles), 
complementary to the scarce scientific literature, and interviewed and analyzed 18 companies to uncover 
reoccurring patterns of governance. Our effort was led by the following research questions: 
RQ1: How do blockchain-based systems impact governance? 
RQ2: How does their governance relate in practice to established forms of governance as well as 
platforms and infrastructures? 
To better characterize the systems we studied, thus to answer our research questions, we related our cases 
to ongoing debates. Most cases that we studied are at early stages, but we see two lines of development 
emerging: One more profit-oriented, the other more motivated by the pursue of public good. Relying on 
the dichotomy well-formalized by Plantin et al. (2016), the former is better explained by the concept of 
platform, the latter by that of infrastructure. It has to be stressed that a platform and infrastructure do not 
necessarily match specific types of blockchains, respectively: In fact, blockchains like those used in many 
land registry cases may be oriented to public good, whereas blockchains like Ethereum may aim at two- or 
multiple-sided markets that are typical of platforms. Last but certainly not least, it has to be stressed that 
these domains of application remain very fluid. So, applications presenting characteristic of platforms 
may develop into infrastructures and vice versa. Plantin (et al. 2016) argue that Facebook and Google 
perform infrastructural functions despite having begun as platforms. Those two concepts, the former 
more suitable for public services and utilities, the latter more for businesses engaged in the so-called 
sharing economy, prospect different forms of governance, which may vary depending on the actors 
involved, main stakeholders, and blockchain’s purpose. Some may point to existing governance types, 
others to novel ones. 
The paper is organized as follows: Our literature review connects works on governance with insights from 
the blockchain domain. After this, our methodological choices are described. For the results section, due 
to space limitations, we clustered kindred cases and present three of them in detail in respect to their 
purpose and the way they are governed; findings from the remaining cases are filled in wherever 
appropriate. The discussion reflects on shown cases, discusses their merits and pitfalls, and sets them in 
relation to established form of governance. The paper concludes with possible avenues for future research.  
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Literature Review  
In this section, we introduce fundamental concepts of blockchain technology, differentiate between 
variations of its current governance, and relate them to existing modes of governance.  
Blockchain Classification 
We will refrain at this point to provide a detailed technical explanation of how blockchains work as this 
paper centers on their advantages and shortcomings from a governance perspective. As foundation, 
however, we rely on Beck et al. (2018) who defines the blockchain as “(…) a decentralized, transactional 
database technology that facilitates validated, tamper-resistant transactions consistent across a large 
number of network participants called nodes”. According to Peters and Panayi (2015), a classification of 
blockchain systems can roughly be seen along the access to transactions (public or private) and the right 
to validate transactions (permissioned or permissionless). 
Access to Transactions Access to Transaction Validation 
 Permissioned Permissionless 
Public 
All nodes can read and submit transactions. Only 
authorized nodes can validate transactions. 
All nodes can read, submit, and validate 
transactions. 
Private 
Only authorized nodes can read, submit, and 
validate transactions. 
 
Table 1. Classification on Blockchain Types, taken from Peters and Panayi (2015) 
Governance and its many Faces 
In an effort to classify forms of governance into archetypes, Williamson (1975) defined the market and the 
hierarchy based on transaction costs (Williamson 1981), i.e. one or the other depend which one has a 
lower transaction costs for a given purpose. Powell (1990) later extended this classification with the 
network, which differs from both market and hierarchy and which is more efficient in domains in which 
trust is central and outcomes are difficult to measure. The bazaar (Demil and Lecocq 2006) as well as the 
tribal (Miscione et al. 2018) archetypes are based on digital modes of governance that emerged later. We 
anticipate them here and explain them below.  
The hierarchy refers to the walled-up, bureaucratic, authority-based fashion of organizing and 
coordinating. Markets, on the other hand, constitute a coordination form in which ownership, price, and 
trade freedom are fundamental. The network refers to relatively stable inter-organizational relations, 
where reputation and reciprocity build a maintain trust, which substitute hierarchical power and the 
invisible hand of market forces. As for the actor’s preferences (Powell 1990; Williamson 1975), they can be 
seen as independent (market), dependent (hierarchy), and interdependent (network). Besides enhancing 
managerial controlling in hierarchies, IT is also said to impact the inter-organizational forms of 
coordinating economic activities (networks and markets) as it facilitates the sharing of data and by that 
lowers costs of agency and coordination. From an agency perspective, IT lowers agency costs in relation to 
one company’s size by providing scalable systems for supervision and coordination (Klein et al. 1978). 
Williamson’s and Powell’s classification does not suffice to capture some of the characteristics which 
emerged after their writings, especially in relation to information technologies. This can be seen in free 
and open-source software (FOSS) with the formulation of the bazaar archetype by Demil and Lecocq 
(2006). FOSS lowers significantly transaction costs through unrestricted access to source code, which 
prevents the trade of software as property. Actors can wander and choose among products upon liking, 
with low incentive and control intensity. The identities of parties are partly relevant, as software 
developers build their reputation. Overall, the bazaar follows the normative basis of openness and 
fairness. Following Miscione et al. (2018), the bazaar differs from (1) networks as togetherness remains 
fluid, (2) from markets as no exclusive ownership on a product is granted, and (3) from hierarchies as 
formal lines of control nor a defined organizational structure can be found. 
As for the last archetype, the tribal governance (Miscione et al. 2018) captures peculiarities of governance 
in the blockchain domain: Blockchains differ from FOSS, thus bazaar, because they bring authentication 
thus uniqueness of data to digital environments, hence rivalry among actors – e.g., a bitcoin/digital 
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tokens always belong to one entity and no one else at any point in time. This contrasts to digital 
infrastructures as we have known them today, where replication costs are nearly null, and scarcity a non-
issue (Benkler 2006; Zittrain 2006). Uniqueness of data (or token in blockchains) gives them value. As 
soon as there are conflicting versions of data, people lose trust in the reliability of the ledger, so its value 
decreases or disappears altogether. The same holds true for a community surrounding blockchains: Its 
users have a mutually dependent interest in the uniqueness and reliability of data and its value, which 
originates an organizational togetherness that the bazaar archetype does not account for and makes forks 
undesirable (Miscione et al. 2018). As the ledger acts as the consensus mechanism, the majority can 
enforce changes to the protocol upon the minority. This fashion of coordination has been labeled “Tribal” 
as it reflects the togetherness of a tribe but also the openness to join or leave other tribes upon liking 
(Miscione et al. 2018). Table 2 contrasts the governance types. 
Features Explanation Market Hierarchy Network Bazaar Tribal 
Contract 
Framework 
Legal framework 
for transaction 
Classical contract 
– Property rights 
Employment 
contract 
Neoclassical 
contract 
Open license 
contract 
Post hoc: A record 
if/when needed 
Coordination 
Mechanism 
Means of governing 
exchanges 
Price 
Formal line 
of authority 
Embedded 
relations 
Product 
Adherence to the 
technical protocol 
Normative 
basis 
Main regulatory 
force 
Market exchanges Forbearance Exchanges 
Openness and 
fairness 
Consensus-based 
Identity of 
parties 
Importance of 
parties’ identities 
Irrelevant Irrelevant Relevant 
Partially 
relevant 
Pseudonym-based 
Nature of 
incentives 
Incentives for 
transacting parties 
Competition Status Reciprocity Reputation 
Hoarding / 
Reliability  
Incentives 
Intensity 
Agent’s motivation 
to contribute 
High Low Intermediate Low High 
Control 
Intensity 
Capacity to enforce 
regulations 
Low High Intermediate Low 
Low (outside) 
Intermediate (inside) 
Table 2. Governance Archetypes and Features, taken from Miscione et al. (2018) 
Public and permissionless Blockchains and their Governance 
The best known and widely spread kind of blockchain are permissionless and public ones like Bitcoin, 
Ethereum, and many, mostly token-based systems, which attracted interest of research (Campbell-
Verduyn 2017; DuPont 2017; Morabito 2017; Reijers et al. 2016; Tapscott and Tapscott 2017). Those 
systems, in general, rely on decentralization, immutability, auditability, and anonymity (Quinn DuPont 
and Bill Maurer 2015), eliminating the need for a third party such as banks or auditors (Gerald P. Dwyer 
2015). Those systems are open for participations either for transacting or validating. Participants can be 
relying on a pseudonymous identification through key pairs (public and private), which may not disclose 
any legal identify. From a user’s perspective, transacting on those systems is incentivized by higher 
transaction speed (minutes instead of days) and lower transaction fees, especially when international 
payments are concerned. In blockchains based on proof-of-work, which is currently the most common 
architecture, validation is incentivized by a reward which is randomly allocated to miners, who can 
increase their chances by providing more hashing power. Incentivizing computing power constitutes a 
core mechanism to ensure transaction validity and network security, thus its allocation keeps miners 
honest. This coordination mechanism of the technical protocol defines how validators can participate in 
the blockchain functioning. Differently from other information systems, developers’ influence over its 
design is counterbalanced by both miners and users’ influence (Morabito 2017; Walport 2016).  
There is neither an identifiable, thus accountable, nor a steering board for Bitcoin or Ethereum but 
influential actors such as core developers (Bitcoin Core contributors), opinion leaders (Vitalik Buterin at 
Ethereum), and mining pools; an eventual agreement of any sorts resides with the variety of actors 
involved in their respective blockchain. Even though the influence of Bitcoin’s core developers and Vitalik 
Buterin on emerging governance issues varies, the absence of a clear decision-making and accountable 
authority challenged both blockchains. Eventually, it caused delayed decision-making processes, an 
attempted centralization of decision power by core developers, and eventually hard forks (De Filippi and 
Loveluck 2016). Public and permissionless blockchains surely constitute an interesting approach to 
governance, but their evolution and trustworthiness on the long term remains to be seen. Other 
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utilizations of blockchains, such as permissioned, private, or consortia-based implementations constitute 
more recent novelties and thus demand exploratory research. 
Inter-organizational Relations, permissioned Blockchains, and Governance 
The prospect of digital scarcity, thus immutability, through native authentication, and the possibility of 
governance through blockchains is also reflected in the rise of business consortia to explore the benefits of 
blockchain technology for own profit-seeking behaviors (Gratzke et al. 2017). Collaboration among 
companies, however, is a challenging endeavor as history has shown (Daugherty et al. 2006; Fawcett et al. 
2015). Inter-firm rivalry, own interest, and lack of trust are some of the many inhibitors to inter-
organizational collaboration; a governance structure in those settings can be safeguarding each company’s 
interests (Fawcett et al. 2015; Walport, 2016).  
Permissioned blockchains vary in assigning transaction, validation, and access rights. While permissioned 
blockchains preserve some permissionless blockchain’s core characteristics such as decentralization, 
immutability, and auditability, the participating actors, in contrast, are known. Thereby, they strive to 
foster collaboration between known (hence accountable) parties with agreed upon validators and other 
enforcing systems to be used to maintain the ledger. Network maintenance, in contrast, is not primarily 
driven by mining but by other, more efficient consensus algorithms like proof-of-stake.  The value of the 
stored data in the permissioned blockchains still depends on its unambiguity, which fosters the 
participants’ common interests and sense of togetherness. Same as in permissionless blockchains, 
consensus on permissioned blockchains is defined by the technical protocol; the decision upon the 
technical protocol, however, relies on the consensus of the parties or consortium which initiate and run 
the blockchain with some shared interest (it has to be noted that once inscribed in technology and 
deployed, the functioning is difficult to change). The latter contrasts both blockchain archetypes: 
Consensus among known parties with shared interests vs. consensus among unknown parties whose 
interests may vary greatly.  
The feature of embedding programming functions on blockchains is appealing as it promises to 
automatize parts of business processes. Those pieces of software are usually referred to as smart contracts 
(Gatteschi et al. 2018). Referring to social contract theories, Reijers, O’Brolcháin, and Haynes (2016) 
concede that smart contracts in blockchains enable to create a self-governing partnership with 
enforceable rules of interaction without the need for a central authority (Werbach 2017). Smart contracts 
thereby contribute to an governance through blockchain (Kitchin 2017; Shermin 2017). It is worth 
mentioning that smart-contracts can be seen as a way to extend the influence of algorithms beyond the 
governance of blockchain to the governance by blockchain (Pelizza and Kuhlmann 2017) to the extend 
they can help governing domains like, e.g., the second-hand car market (Notheisen et al. 2017). Same as 
with many other systems, the business logic inherent to a smart contract depends on its environment and 
is subject to change (Nitto et al. 2008). This requires the collaborating parties that run the system to agree 
on a minimum common ground, which may vary in inter-organizational collaboration (Daugherty et al. 
2006).  
Methodology   
Building on what is commonly understood as blockchain governance, we strove to explore how 
organizations at different levels of advancement in their blockchain efforts approach governance 
(blockchains in conceptualization, development, or operational), what purposes they serve, and – as much 
as possible – how they put them in practice. As typical for exploratory research (Briggs and Schwabe 2011; 
Stebbins 2001), we utilized all available sources and derived appropriate concepts to describe them. 
Overall, we followed those steps: A literature review, semi-structured expert interviews, review of grey 
literature, data analysis, and evaluation and refinement, which are detailed in the following. 
First, we conducted a literature review, which covered the relatively scarce body of academic publications 
available to date following the methodology proposed by vom Brocke et al. (2009). We retrieved those 
publications from searches on the main online databases (including Scopus, Web-of-Science, Google 
Scholar, iEEE), using a variety of search terms about blockchain governance and used both forward and 
backward searches. Then, the same approach has been utilized to cast a typology about shared systems 
and how organizations strove to collaborate using shared systems in the past, e.g. in the supply chain 
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domain (Stevens and Johnson 2016). This allowed to put permissioned blockchains in a broader academic 
context. This depicted the state of the art and further enabled us to define our interview questions.  
Interview Case No. Domain Location Maturity Role 
1 1 Land Registry Ghana Proof-of-Concept CEO 
2 2 Land Registry Honduras Proof-of-Concept Project Manager 
3 3 Supply Chain USA Operational IT Employee 
4 4 Cryptocurrency Globally Operational Team Coach 
5 5 Land Registry Estonia/Sweden Completed Proof-of-Concept Project Lead 
6 6 Cryptocurrency Globally Operational Project Lead 
7 7 Supply chain Switzerland Conceptual Board Member 
8 8 Cryptocurrency Globally Conceptual Project Lead 
9 9 Supply chain China Conceptual CEO and Founder 
10 10 IPR Globally Completed Proof-of-Concept Associate Director 
11 11 Supply chain Belgium Completed Proof-of-Concept Co-founder and CPO 
12 10 IPR Globally Conceptual Application Engineer 
13 12 Cryptocurrency Switzerland Operational IT Director 
14 11 Supply Chain Belgium Completed Proof-of-Concept Business Developer 
15 13 IPR Globally Operational Application Director 
16 14 Land Registry Georgia PoC Security Managers 
17 14 Land Registry Georgia Conceptual Project Manager 
18 15 Cryptocurrency Switzerland Completed Proof-of-Concept CEO 
Table 3. Overview on Interviewees and Cases, adapted from Ziolkowski et al. (2018) 
Second, as for the empirical part, since 2017 we searched for as many actual blockchain systems as 
possible on a variety of online sources like Crunchbase and Coindesk. Identifying cases of operational 
blockchains, however, proved a difficult task. While there is a plethora of blockchain startups, GitHub 
projects, and similar in the initiating phase, advanced blockchain-based systems are hard to find. As a 
result, scientific research with solid empirical grounding appears still scarce. From a longlist of 121 
companies, we chose those we deemed most mature and appropriate based on company size, 
collaborators, time length of operation, and revenue, if available, which resulted in 42 companies whose 
representatives we invited for expert interviews. Those have mostly been held via phone or conference 
calls with an average duration of one hour in the fashion of semi-structured interviews, following the 
classification by Myers and Newman (2007), in respect to the exploratory character of our research, 
leaving room to lean towards interviewee’s perspective and to foster discussions. To assure the right 
framing and the appropriate person to speak to, we introduced our research in brief and sent exemplary 
questions beforehand. 18 representatives from 15 different companies responded to our call. Our 
interview sample thereby covers blockchain experts from higher management from various parts of the 
world, and a variety of application domains as it can be seen in table 3. The interviews were then 
transcribed as a preparation for coding. 
Next, we complemented the interview data with additional information, mainly from grey literature 
(whitepapers, widely considered authoritative specialized blogs and news-site, practitioner’s reports, 
company websites), on respective companies to enhance the internal validity of our findings through 
triangulation of different data sources. As for the analysis, we coded all information and discussed the 
results among ourselves. Our coding dimensions centered around governance and system characteristics: 
(1) The purpose (aspired business case/fit of blockchain), placement of (2) accountabilities, (3) incentives, 
and (4) decisions and their enactment, (5) related actors and their relationships, (6) challenges 
(technology- or organization-related), and (7) system design. As all researchers involved in the coding 
process were familiar with related concepts, a training for coding was not deemed necessary. The 
triangulation of data caused rare disagreements among coders; where necessary, deviating codings were 
resolved through discussion on the basis of available information. For external feedback, we made the 
coding results available to other research groups and revised them in accordance to their feedback where 
necessary.  
Our coding has shown certain patterns about the way governance is practiced. Rather than presenting all 
cases in detail in the results section, we highlight three cases, each standing for several kindred cases. For 
a first conceptualization system-wise, we compared our codes with the features that Plantin et al. (2016) 
proposed. Later, we considered our results to the governance archetypes (Demil and Lecocq 2006; 
Miscione et al. 2018; Powell 1990; Williamson 1975). The coding’s results are shown in tables 4-9 below. 
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Results  
Our interviews focused on how blockchain systems impact governance in their respective domains. The 
following three cases, which represent groups of kindred cases, illustrate these impacts. We introduce 
each case in brief and explain its underlying governance system. In a next step, we relate our findings to 
Plantin et al.'s (2016) items for classifying the cases into platforms or infrastructures. 
Blockchain-based Land Registries 
The land registry domain gained attention in the last years as a promising use case for blockchain systems 
as they may overcome several of the challenges of this complex and multi-stakeholder (land-owners, 
brokers, notaries, banks, and state agencies) inter-organizational setting with far-fetched ramifications in 
all parts of economy and society. The processes of authenticating rightful land ownership and the 
rightfulness of a land ownership transfer vary vastly among countries; overall, they can be considered 
slow, sparsely digitized, often opaque, and costly. Because of its high valuations at stake, not least for its 
use as collateral, land registration is heavily exposed to fraudulent behaviors which have been particularly 
problematic in developing countries (De’ 2005, 2006). From a cost perspective, notaries would charge up 
to 4% of the property’s value for granting a state certificate; in EastLand (anonymized), e.g., the land 
registry application fees range between 50-200 USD (against a GDP per capita in 2016 of USD 4,000 ca.) 
depending on the speed of the transaction to be notarized. Especially in developing countries, those high 
costs contribute to a high percentage of land left unregistered, up to approximately 78% in Ghana (Kshetri 
2017). Furthermore, most of those records are paper-based. A blockchain system promises to increase the 
efficiency cost- and time-wise dramatically; the same could hold true for the transparency and reliability 
of records. On a blockchain, both costs could be reduced to no more than 0.05-0.10 USD per transaction 
(Kshetri 2017). From a temporal perspective, the processes of land registration or transfer might be 
conducted within days instead of months. Last but not least, transparency and immutability of the ledger 
may reduce corruption. The following case of EastLand (anonymized, case in eastern Europe) depicts its 
properties further; in its core, its kindred with three more cases we analyzed. 
The blockchain-based Land Registry in eastern Europe and its Governance 
EastLand is a well-known country for its advancements in digitizing public services. Since banks, notaries, 
and EastLand’s agency of land registry (ALR) are loosely coupled and cannot trace processes amongst 
each other, mistakes occur and they are costly to correct, also for citizens. Hence, EastLand’s ALR started 
in 2016 a project together with a platform developer for a blockchain-based land registry. Their goals have 
been to digitize and facilitate transacting in registering and transferring land ownership. In a first effort, 
the paper-based records of land ownership have been digitized and imported into a private and 
permissioned blockchain. Relying on the digital version of all records, the platform developer 
implemented a set of smart contracts for the process of buying and selling land which aim to replace the 
previously manually conducted authentication processes. Those measures do not only promise to 
decrease transaction costs in land registry or transfer by avoiding costs associated with hiring and 
interfering with legal authorities but are also said to increase the reliability of records. This motif has been 
confirmed by other stakeholders in land registry projects in northern Europe, middle America, and 
Northern Africa, who we interviewed.  
The governance of EastLand’s land registry function is organized in collaboration of several parties and 
the ALR. Although their blockchain system is technically consensus-based, the ALR is leading the effort 
while holding major decision rights, inter alia on system design, data authenticity, and access control. As 
the lone gatekeeper to the system, the ALR effectively steers the in- and outflow of participating actors. 
The ALR further can exclude unwanted actors or reverse fraudulent transactions, which overcomes 
blockchain’s decentralization dogma. Indeed, the ALR is imposing its decisions onto others what  is 
remarkable for blockchain systems which are rooted in the rejection of authorities. We could observe a 
similar governance approach in the other land registry cases we considered. As major decision rights are 
centralized at the ALR’s, its governance might point towards a hierarchy, in which transacting agents 
follow a formal line of authority with bureaucratic procedures, which are partly automatized. 
The main issue, which too often is conflated with immutability, is how to certify data quality before it gets 
on the immutable ledger. In Eastland, the ALR is responsible for data entry to the system, which requires 
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trust in its reliability. For the sake of transparency, the ALR foresees two measures: firstly, it allows 
parties to access the ledger, which contains all historical data, and thereby to control the well-functioning 
of the system (banks, notaries, and later also citizens). Secondly, its own blockchain is concatenated with 
another one to implement a backup function: The state of the ledger is backed up to the Bitcoin 
blockchain in form of a hash at specified points in time. This serves as a checkpoint and prevents 
fraudulent behavior on past transactions; the immutable Bitcoin blockchain thereby assures a given state 
of the land registry ledger at a given time. Interestingly enough, this may open up a novel legal dimension 
as it may decouple claims on land ownership from its local jurisdiction. This may prove helpful when 
records are in doubt, local authorities would not help, EastLand’s system fails to work, or, in extreme 
cases, when states are overtaken.  
In sum, EastLand’s case shows an example of how a blockchain-based system impacts the land registry 
function and its governance (see table 4). Creating a distributed system within an existing eco-system 
while preserving some centralized decision-making locus may prove a promising solution to (1) share the 
audit of the system for accountability, (2) foster inter-organizational business process integration (hence, 
efficiency gains), and (3) increase the reliability of records (trust in the overall system). 
Feature Description 
Governance  Governed in a hierarchical fashion 
Actors Platform provider, the agency of land registry of EastLand (ALR), Representatives of civil society, banks 
Domain Public Administration 
Purpose 
Digitizing land registry records and facilitating transfer of land ownership; part of a major government 
digitization initiative (similar to the cases of Northern Africa, Northern Europe, and Middle East) 
Prior Governance 
Point-to-point, distributed coordination of actors with state being in charge; notaries, banks, and state 
share responsibility but act independent; manual authentication; non-transparent and tedious processes 
Impact on 
Governance 
Actors tightly coupled; State has technological leadership while allowing banks, notaries, and citizens to 
audit its operation; a set of smart contracts govern land and fund exchange; besides digitization, lower 
transaction and agency costs (transparency); data integrity ensured through multiple blockchains 
Table 4. Governance in a blockchain-based Land Registry 
Towards a public blockchain-based Infrastructure 
Following the classification of Plantin et al. (2016), the current implementation covers many of the 
characteristics of an infrastructure which is in line with the other cases we collected data about (see table 
5). From an architectural standpoint, the ALR, together with the platform developer, runs the only 
validating node – the control over the system is, hence, centralized under state authority. Other parties, 
such as central or commercial banks, and representatives of civil society, however, run auditing nodes, 
which allows them to double-check occurring transactions for validity and their compliance with law. The 
property transactions are not public for citizens to see them, yet. On the long run, reading access for 
citizens will be granted – transaction details, however, will remain private. The overall system is 
heterogeneous and connects the blockchain system with systems of other digitization initiatives (e.g., 
electronic personal ID linked to the land registry system) and, hence, can be considered as tightly 
integrated; their interoperability is thereby assured through standards set by the ALR. The system is 
further regulated exclusively in public interests with its focus on public value, as a land registry acts as an 
essential service of property ownership. Standards are de jure (at the moment) and dictated by the ALR.  
The blockchain-based land registry is designed with scalability and longevity in mind, hence long-term 
reliability and availability of data. Thereby, the blockchain-based system should be able to scale to cover 
all country’s land, so to cover all land titles, ideally. For the time being however, this scale is not yet 
reached. As for the agency, users would be locked in the system because a competing system would put 
data integrity in doubt (scarcity of data); a fork of the same blockchain would theoretically be possible – in 
practice, the previously described link to the Bitcoin blockchain would make forks ineffective as the 
authentic ledger always can be identified. A further anchor for data authenticity, which applies solely to 
the case of EastLand, comes from the known identities of actors through a digital personal ID for citizens; 
transactions can therefore be allocated to legal persons. The latter is of particular importance as this 
allows for an accountability of actions, which can be used in courts in case of disputes. 
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Feature Description 
Architecture 
Heterogeneous systems connected via gateways; interwoven with other infrastructures; embedded in the 
overall architecture of government digitization initiatives (e.g. national ID per citizen); ALR as system 
gatekeeper with the only validating node; Banks and other interested parties may become auditing 
nodes; centralization of authority at the state’s (similar to other land registry cases) 
Interoperability Interoperability will be assured through standards; tightly integrated 
Focal interest 
Public value; essential service. Empowering citizens to conduct necessities regardless their geographic 
location 
Standards De jure; set by state agencies (as the ALR) 
Temporality Long-term; reliability is crucial for data integrity 
Scale Large to very large, country-based 
Funding Government 
Agency of users Theoretically locked-in; one source of truth regarding land registry entries. Practically, forks are possible  
Table 5. Land Registry Description, Features taken from Plantin et al. (2016) 
Car Data and blockchain-based Systems 
The information asymmetry constitutes an integral part of markets and causes the parties with better 
information to strike better deals Akerlof (1970). In the following, we shed light on the promising solution 
which currently is in progress and which promises to solve some of those challenges. The automotive 
sector is a promising domain for blockchain-based systems. In the past years, many initiatives have been 
launched to digitize the eco-system around the car. Those initiatives range from B2B platforms for 
authenticating spare parts to the aggregation of a car’s related data itself for information transparency. 
The latter relates to Market for Lemons by the Nobel Laurate Akerlof (1970), which regards the 
information asymmetry in the used-car market – bad cars are said to supersede good ones to their 
extinction. Tracing car’s lifecycle, aggregating its data, hence, aims at reducing the information 
asymmetry between buyer and seller by making data immutable and accessible to different parties in the 
same eco-system.  
The blockchain-based CarDossier and its Governance 
During a lifecycle of a car, numerous stakeholders (insurances, repair shops, state agencies, and many 
more) are involved. These conduct authentication processes manifold (such as proof of car ownership, 
insurance/driver’s license validity) while collaborating merely to the necessary degree; this leaves all 
information of a car fragmented at best which entices to opportunistic behavior. The CarDossier, a Swiss-
based project initiated in early 2017, strives to overcome these challenges. For the time being it consists of 
a consortium of major stakeholders in the Swiss car ecosystem such as the biggest importer and repair 
shop of cars, a major insurance, a road traffic agency, legal experts, a mobility service provider, as well as 
a research and an IT implementation partner. Building a blockchain-based system to gather, maintain, 
and access car-related data benefits businesses, citizens, and state agencies as it constitutes a promising 
approach to reduce the information asymmetry of car-related data and to achieve operational excellence 
amongst each other. To make the system work, not only car drivers but also corporations and state 
agencies contribute car-related data (e.g., telemetric, accident history, changes to the car) which in turn 
may be accessed and processed by others for financial compensation. The CarDossier entitles the car-
owner to decide upon his/her data, which differs from corporations using data for their own profit.  
The CarDossier includes an organizational core which consists of a board of representatives of major 
stakeholder in the car ecosystem; all major decision rights are centralized at the board’s level. Their 
demands are translated into system requirements and then developed and enacted by a third-party 
platform provider. The collaborating partner’s interests are not the same but partly overlap. It is therefore 
of highest importance to safeguard each partner’s interest to maintain their willingness to collaborate. 
The CarDossier project, hence, ensures all major stakeholder’s voice to be heard in regular board 
meetings. The decision-making process, however, is split in two: Members are allowed to propose changes 
to the system, similar to the DAO. While lower-critical changes can be decided, budgeted, developed (by 
the third-party platform developer), and enacted autonomously upon vote by its members, strategic 
decisions remain decided upon vote at the board to ensure the project’s right course.  
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The overview allowed by blockchain data offers an audit trail that guarantees the data about a car has not 
been tempered with. As in the case of EastLand, rightfulness depends on data quality, not immutability. If 
wrong data is entered, it remains wrong on the blockchain. What is worth stressing instead is that 
immutability is a good deterrent of fraud, because wrong data stays wrong and can be brought to court. 
What’s more, the system collects personal and car-related data. While the sharing of the latter is rather 
harmless, the former is quite sensitive, and drawing the line between the two may not be straightforward. 
To be legally compliant, the system has to be designed compartmentalizing different kinds of data. The 
CarDossier not only provides a single source for car data, but also immutable, shared, and agreed upon 
functions, e.g. the rules for data access management (via encryption/decryption). These rules are 
inscribed in smart contracts and vary per role (a role represents an actor in the ecosystem); a role merely 
sees data which s/he is allowed to see. A role can further inhere rights to perform specific functions, such 
as issuing an electronic vehicle registration document (road traffic agency) or the insurance certificate 
(insurer).  
At its very core, the CarDossier inheres the same architectural design and governance as four more 
companies we interviewed and analyzed; in those cases, know-your-object (KYO) was targeted, meaning 
the tracking of a good throughout its supply chain and making this information visible to supply chain 
participants for one and to end customers for two. Those systems offer a means for prior loosely 
integrated entities to connect and collaborate through a shared repository of formerly isolated or not 
available data.  
In sum, the CarDossier relies on the strengths of blockchain-based systems in inter-organizational 
settings shown in EastLand in terms of (1) shared audit of data for accountability, (2) efficiency gains 
through process integration, and (3) an enhanced reliability of records. Following the classification by 
Powell, the envisioned blockchain-based implementation may fit well to the network archetype. The 
CarDossier is further described in table 6 below. 
Feature Description 
Governance (Business) Network 
Actors 
Major stakeholder in the Swiss car ecosystem: An insurance, importer and repair shop, mobility provider, 
road traffic agency, legal experts, an IT consultancy 
Domain Automotive 
Purpose 
Digitizing front- and backend processes, public and private. Enhancing trust in the used-car market with 
holistic and historic data. Bringing data ownership to data owners. 
Prior Governance 
This is a novel collaboration, comparable collaboration characteristics: Conventional business 
collaboration; contractual means (manual definition and enforcement); consensus by meetings 
Impacts on 
Governance 
Possibility of proposing advancements of the system (and its automatized enactment upon agreement); 
Division into autonomous/strategic decisions; welcoming end-users to participate in decision-making 
processes; Data Access Management / Transaction permissions governed via smart contracts; clear audit 
trail through (authentic) transactional data – lower agency costs 
Table 6. Governance in the blockchain-based CarDossier 
 
Between a Platform for Data Exchange and an Infrastructure for public Use 
Relating to the classification of Plantin et al. (2016), does the CarDossier constitute a platform or an 
infrastructure? Defining the CarDossier’s system characteristics is challenging. From an architectural 
point of view, the CarDossier provides a stable core system (the ledger) which will be complemented with 
variable components in the hands of other companies – an insurance, e.g., could wish to extract data from 
the ledger for own analytical purposes by using the CarDossier’s API. The latter would point towards a 
platform characteristic. The CarDossier, however, also assures interoperability through standards which 
constitutes an infrastructure characteristic. The focal interest, however, lies between public value, private 
profit, and user benefits. The latter also have a say in the CarDossier’s design as they can make proposals 
which are voted upon. The intended timeframe, points at the infrastructure perspective because of its 
expected long-term life-cycle, with special regard on reliability with a large to very large scale. The system 
is funded via pay-per-use, which reflects a private cost-recovery mode. One could argue, however, that the 
CarDossier would provide an essential service for the domain, if embedded right, on a large scale with a 
 Exploring Blockchain Governance across inter-organizational Settings 
  
 Thirty Ninth International Conference on Information Systems, San Francisco 2018 11 
public interest, which would point towards an infrastructure. In the foreseeable future, the CarDossier will 
be enacted as a platform; depending on the extent of public value, use, and interoperability, however, it 
may undergo the process of infrastructuralization (Plantin et al. 2016). Table 7 below summarizes its 
characteristics. 
Feature Description 
Architecture 
Stable core system; modular, variable complementary components; Provision of an API and basic 
CarDossier Frontend; Loosely integrated with other systems on partner’s side; one validating node per 
stakeholder; peers can be set accordingly. Data access management based on encryption and decryption. 
Interoperability Interoperability will be assured through standards; loosely integrated systems 
Focal interest 
Primarily user benefits as it targets the purchase of a used-car. Private profit in form of service 
optimization through analytics and public value through trust in used-car market  
Standards De facto; made in consensus and set by the consortium 
Temporality Long-term; reliability is crucial for data integrity. Updating due to novel types of data cannot be excluded 
Scale Small to very large, country-based 
Funding Pay-per-use, platform character 
Agency of users Theoretically locked-in; one source of truth regarding car data. Practically, forks are possible 
Table 7. CarDossier Case Description, Features taken from Plantin et al. (2016) 
Blockchain-based Money Management 
The public service of money management, has been challenged by Bitcoin and the plethora of 
cryptocurrencies that sprung recently. According to common-wisdom of this industry, parties like banks 
and state agencies are needed to ensure the integrity and well-functioning of the financial system. In this 
multi-tiered system, the authentication of a transaction lies in the hand of established organizations, and 
customers have no alternatives but relying on those intermediaries to act honestly, and not to exploit the 
status quo to their only advantage. In general, this system has proven to work, even if costs, especially for 
international money transfers, remain high. The financial crisis, however, has shown that current 
financial services can fail. This acted as a catalyst for alternative currencies to rise. In Bitcoin, the 
authentication of a transaction is conducted on a technical level by 51% of computing power, thus 
omitting the reliance on any external third party. The eco-system around Bitcoin and the likes consists of 
actors such as miners, developers, exchanges, wallet providers, and users (wallet holders). Users are 
allowed to propose Bitcoin improvement proposals (BIP) which are discussed in a public forum, then 
assessed by core developers and applied if a majority consensus is met. The integrity of the ledger, 
however, lies in the hand of the miners which are financially incentivized to mine through the same 
tokens they mine. The mining rewards constitutes a major governance mechanism as it steers the 
community’s behavior. 
The Governance of Cryptocurrencies 
One may expect that currencies, being the usual counterpart of trades, are defined by market governance. 
Indeed, this idea is not new. A century ago Hayek proposed to get away from state/fiat currencies and let 
private currencies to coexist and compete. His proposal didn’t uproot state money, which still counts for 
nearly all world trades. While the emergence of cryptocurrencies revamped Hayek’s ideas, the principles 
of market do not appear to define crypto. Rather, the systems of cryptocurrencies (table 8), whose 
governance was labeled Tribal (Miscione et al. 2018), is based on consensus, coordinated by a technical 
protocol, they rely on pseudonymous identities and incentivize hoarding (because of their deflationary 
nature). Reliability granted by large mining pools, is paired with low control intensity from the outside 
and intermediate from the inside. The mining reward, constitutes an important governance mechanism as 
increasing or lowering mining rewards would influence the miners’ willingness to mine and, hence, 
influence the systems security. 
Other cases (4, 6, 8, 12, and 15) we considered showed commonalities, but also differences. One of those 
considers a company in Africa working with their own fork of Bitcoin. Their intention to fork lays in being 
independent from Bitcoin’s decision-making and security risks it may entail (e.g., mining pool 
centralization). Another relevant case is based in Germany, and it is also about a Bitcoin fork; they forked 
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to add more functionalities to its payment system. The latter and the former cases, and forks of Bitcoin in 
general, show cryptocurrencies to be easily adaptable to community’s needs, which links to Hayek’s 
thought of them not being mere market participants but rather what has been labeled Tribal. 
Feature Description 
Governance  Tribal 
Actors Developers, Bitcoin foundation, miners, exchange platforms, wallet providers, (master) nodes 
Domain Cryptocurrency 
Purpose 
Peer to peer fund transfer; Faster, cheaper, and more reliable fund transfer; alternative to 
conventional transaction systems; self-determination 
Prior Governance 
State-backed network, distributed coordination of actors with state being in charge (formally); 
banks, and state share responsibility but act independent; manual authentication; costly 
Impacts on Governance 
Distributed system, distributed decision-making authority; BIP steer development; no one 
(formally) accountable/responsible (unknown actors); actor coordination through protocol 
Table 8. Governance of Cryptocurrencies 
Towards a public blockchain-based Infrastructure 
From a technical perspective, Bitcoin and the other cryptocurrencies fit to the infrastructure type. As for 
the architecture, they consist of heterogeneous systems and networks running the same protocol. 
Furthermore, they are interoperable through defined technical standards. Standards are set de facto and 
the temporality is long-term where system reliability is crucial due to its essential character relating to 
public good; updating, however, will be done when necessary. Its scale ranges from large to very large and 
may become ubiquitous if any of these currencies becomes embedded into everyone’s daily life. Its 
funding is achieved through coins for mining and pay-per-use (transaction fees). While theoretically, 
communities could choose to fork towards an own system, those networks rely on a critical mass to 
maintain the systems. Since Bitcoin is the first of its kind and obtained the largest scale since then, one 
could argue the Bitcoin network to be the first proven blockchain-based public infrastructure. Table 9 
sums up their features. 
Feature Description 
Architecture 
Large pool of heterogeneous systems executing a mining protocol in the backend; interwoven with other 
infrastructures; Open for access (links to the Bitcoin blockchain are found in many other use cases as 
backups) and transparent in transaction history; Bitcoin Improvement Proposals (BIP) can be submitted 
by anyone, implemented by core developers if strong majority agreed upon; Proof-of-Work 
Interoperability Interoperability of those systems is assured; loosely integrated; easily replaceable 
Focal interest Public / Community interests; essential service by providing safer, faster, and cheaper payment 
Standards De facto; set through consensus by the community and implemented by developers 
Temporality Long-term; reliability is crucial for data and transaction integrity 
Scale Large to very large, ubiquitous 
Funding Pay-per-use (Bitcoin transaction fee) 
Agency of users 
Theoretically locked-in; one source of truth regarding transaction and historical data integrity; 
Practically, forks are possible. 
Table 9. Cryptocurrency Description, Features taken from Plantin et al. (2016) 
 
Discussion  
In this research, we relied on three main cases, each of them represents a group of kindred cases, to shed 
some new light on the emerging phenomena of blockchain governance. In pursuing this objective, we 
were guided by two research questions: 
RQ1: How do blockchain-based systems impact governance? 
RQ2: How does their governance relate in practice to established forms of governance as well as 
platforms and infrastructures? 
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We start with the answer to the former, then continue with the latter. 
Blockchain-based Systems and their Impact on Governance 
Each of the analyzed cases’ governance is well-characterized by aforementioned governance archetypes: 
In the form of established ones seen on a hierarchy (Land Registry) and a network (CarDossier), but also 
in rather emergent ones seen on a tribe (cryptocurrencies). In general, we see that blockchain systems 
impact governance in practice; these differences may signal broader relevance for archetypes, but this 
discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. To proof our points, we summarize in the following our 
findings from the case analyses which characterize governance but also show their shortcomings and set 
them in relation to existing scientific works. 
Sharing the audit for accountability. Interestingly enough, and counterintuitively for blockchains, 
the blockchain-based land registry gains its legitimation from a single party, who remains in charge of 
major decisions. The latter is pivotal as land titles constitute high values at stake. While this centralization 
of power overcomes blockchain’s promise of decentralization, the ALR offers full transparency of its 
records and operations by inviting other parties to audit; this thought is native to blockchain systems and 
in line with the CarDossier and Bitcoin. However, in the case of northern Africa and EastLand, an 
additional link to the Bitcoin blockchain further certificates the integrity of past records at a given point in 
time. Both the concatenation of blockchains and a shared audit creates a multi-tier security architecture 
which allows to reconstruct records even if single points of the system fail; this approach is especially 
appealing for developing countries where social order and state powers are often volatile. While this 
constitutes a promising mechanism to overcome the unwanted tampering of records, the system becomes 
dependent on the well-functioning of Bitcoin, whose longevity remains to be seen.  
Efficiency gains. The re-organization and the efficiency gains can most evidently be seen in the 
CarDossier project. The extensive utilization of smart contracts to embed business logic to provide 
automatized financial compensation, data access management, and transaction permissions facilitates the 
interaction of users with the system and promises to improve the governance of the used-car market 
through a blockchain (Miscione et al. 2018; Pelizza and Kuhlmann 2017); blockchain systems thereby 
allow for a more granular planning of governance functions (as they are written in code) and to enact 
them automatically when defined criteria are met (similar to DAOs). As above, the expectation is, hence, 
to lower transaction and agency costs (Klein et al. 1978).  
In the intentions of the blockchain-based systems in the land registry domain, our findings show that all 
those and related functions remain enacted in the fashion of a hierarchy led by the state; actors in the land 
registry ecosystem (the state, banks, notaries, and citizens), however, now partake in a distributed system 
that guarantees the immutability of transactions, which promises to lower not just transaction but also 
agency costs. In practice, a set of smart contracts ensures the exchange of funds and land titles. This 
enacts the notion of governance through blockchain (Pelizza and Kuhlmann 2017) and fosters a novel way 
of making and enforcing contracts (Reijers et al. 2016). Said efficiency gains show how a blockchain-based 
system can act as a catalyst for digitization in the public administration while empowering citizens to 
conduct their business in a faster and more efficient way. 
The togetherness of parties inherent to a KYO-case such as the CarDossier project is of different nature 
than in the case of EastLand as it concerns a more dispersed and flatter inter-organizational 
collaboration. The CarDossier consortium represents various stakeholders with various interests but at 
least some sort of common interest to collaborate; hence, we classified this mode of governance ‘network’. 
While the blockchain-based system can be ensured as far as possible to function in the intended fashion, it 
can be questioned, if it can overcome inhibitors to inter-organizational collaboration (Fawcett et al. 2015). 
While low trust and poor data quality certainly can be improved upon, inhibitors such as inter-firm rivalry 
or own interests may persist. Unlike in the hierarchy, where trust in the system can be instilled or 
enforced from the top, this multi-party network needs to build mutual trust to operate. The trust into the 
system and its outputs has to be produced (Werbach 2017); instead of authenticating a single, peer-to-
peer transaction, a governing body may be needed to ensure the authenticity and the well-functioning of 
the blockchain-based system. For the organization behind it, the CarDossier project strives to instill a 
democratic character through regular consortia meetings to make voices heard – the project, shows an 
interesting dilemma which may be inherent to many consortia-based collaboration endeavors: Mutual 
dependence (to aggregate data) and own interest (not to share data).  
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Data immutability as a deterrent of fraud. While the technical consensus of blockchain-based 
systems solves the Byzantine General’s problem on a temporal dimension, the message he wants to share 
with his generals remains a challenge: The input to blockchain-based systems is crucial. As soon as an 
entry has been made, it is irreversible, at least in theory. What entry has been made remains in the hands 
of the users or authorities; if a land title is wrongfully assigned to someone, this wrong statement would 
be maintained by the blockchain (and immutable). It can therefore be questioned if a blockchain-based 
land registry would solve problems, especially in developing countries, where corruption or a certain 
mistrust into the political order and its operation is widespread. In consortia-based blockchains as the 
CarDossier, where more complex data is dealt with, authenticating the truthfulness of data entries 
constitutes a challenging task. Even though one may assign several parties with the same information to 
cross-validate its truthfulness – at larger scale, this may become a daunting endeavor. The full potential of 
a blockchain-based system seems to be dependent on actors’ honesty. It can be argued then that network 
and tribal governance risk to fall back to some sort of hierarchy with a high (and expensive) control 
intensity which would question the necessity for a blockchain-based system. However, immutability can 
be a good deterrent of fraud: Wrong data stays wrong and can be brought to court, which might steer 
participants behavior towards acting honestly. 
System evolution. While smart contracts seem promising, one should keep an eye on risks (DuPont 
2017), especially when automatisms are expected to generally avoid human supervision. Analogous to the 
case of EastLand, the CarDossier project develops its platform under the technical lead of an IT provider. 
The utilization of smart contracts and the design of the overall platform, hence, come with same 
limitations of possible misdesign because of misunderstanding or changing socio-technical environments 
(Morabito 2017); remaining aware that the environment of an IT system changes over time (Nitto et al. 
2008), smart contracts eventually require updating. This increases the risk of incompatible contracts and 
misalignment between requirements and design. The latter also opens the door for ad-hoc decision-
making in case of malfunctions and ‘precedents’, a crucial issue, especially in countries with Common Law 
(as opposed to Civil Law). So, in case of disputes, the last resort in all land registry cases we analyzed 
remain courts. We are not aware of any blockchain-based record that has undergone a trial. It would be of 
great theoretical and practical relevance to follow such process and see the outcome. Indeed, our findings 
in land registries and the CarDossier support the claim that intended automatic as well as human 
decision-making often takes place side-by-side, sometimes distinct and sometimes in competition. Rather 
than substituting, automatisms are therefore merging with other modes of governance.  
Blockchain-based Systems between Platforms and Infrastructures 
This part focuses on the relationship between our case-studies and their relationship to platforms and 
infrastructures. Our results show that several similarities as well as differences can be seen, e.g. in the 
cases of land registries or cryptocurrencies. Even though blockchain-based applications did not prove 
themselves at scale, yet (except for Bitcoin and a few others) the interest in using blockchain technology 
for public services is remarkable. The problem of scale cannot be overemphasized; the Internet, in its 
beginning, also has been thought of having a very narrow set of use cases to be applied for. Then it became 
the infrastructure we know today (analogies between blockchains being the new internet have been made 
repeatedly). The interest in those use cases is due to the native authentication that blockchain system 
provides: State agencies not only spend a significant amount of effort into authenticating documents 
between parties and giving public deed, they also put their credibility and legitimation in those. 
Blockchain systems provide this function natively as long as rightful data is entered. As argued in the 
results section, land registries aspire to become public infrastructures handled in a quasi-hierarchical 
fashion. So, a blockchain-based system would ease the ways hierarchies can steer related actors through a 
shared audit and clearer accountabilities. Bitcoin might be another infrastructure; this hypothesis is 
backed by a high fit of infrastructural criteria such as reliability, ubiquity, and interconnectedness. The 
architecture of such systems as Bitcoin or a public infrastructure, however, is in high dependency on other 
infrastructures (network systems, protocols, and further) which are out of their control; a mere 
blockchain system would raise doubt regarding its reliability in an extreme situation such as a power 
outage, or foreign invasion. As public records are of paramount interest, those systems have to provide 
multiple levels of assurance. The case of EastLand and Northern Africa show their architecture to be 
interwoven with other (public) trans-jurisdictional blockchains where a backup in form of a hash is sent to 
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in a regular timeframe. Northern Europe, for another, runs its blockchain system next to the regular land 
registry system for backup.  
Besides infrastructures, we also identified cases to mostly fit to the characteristics put forward by platform 
studies (Plantin et al. 2016). The CarDossier inherits platform features such as programmability and the 
connection of heterogeneous actors. Being initiated with a conventional platform in mind, the CarDossier 
may become both platform and infrastructure, in a sort of freemium arrangement: An infrastructure for 
public use for process optimization and a platform for exchanges by heterogeneous actors; this, however, 
depends on the extent to which public services and use would be enacted. By this, however, the 
CarDossier’s API remains in the platform’s, which centralizes decision rights on the initiators’ and 
maintainers’. So, the CarDossier platform enables a blockchain-based multi-sided market (especially 
sellers, buyers, companies) and is governed in a network fashion; untypical for platforms, it is thereby not 
led by a single organization but by a consortium establishing and maintaining it. 
Conclusion  
This paper analyzes the governance of (system governance) and through (brought by the system) 
blockchain-based systems and argues they impact the way governance can be enacted. We have shown (1) 
how blockchain-based systems can act as catalysts for digitization and efficiency gains (Land Registry), (2) 
how they provide efficiency gains in inter-organizational collaboration by automatizing business logic 
(CarDossier), and (3) how they can provide governance without a de facto steering body 
(Cryptocurrencies). We contrasted those impacts to common modes of governance to answer the question 
if and how they would be impacted. We further critically reflected on the use of smart contracts for 
incorporating business logic and problems it may bring as well as collaboration problems a blockchain-
based system may not solve. Those insights may guide practitioner’s work. We further related our cases to 
the notions of platforms and infrastructures and argue Bitcoin already to be an infrastructure embedded 
in our daily lives; platforms such as the CarDossier, which will remain a platform in the foreseeable 
future, may eventually become infrastructures by providing essential services with public value at scale. 
Same as for every research, our study comes with limitations. First and foremost, governance is best seen 
when enacted and finding operational blockchain solutions is challenging. Hence, we relied on the most 
mature cases we could find; enhancing our outreach with further cases would certainly improve the 
validity of our findings for one. For two, as our study covers four application domains, considering further 
application domains could reveal further blockchain impacts on governance our sample does not account 
for. Further, academic discourse on blockchain governance is ongoing; hence, we strove to utilize well-
known works from adjacent domains as complementary sources to improve the understanding on 
blockchain governance in practice. 
Influenced by this research, several future research avenues may arise. As for cryptocurrencies, this 
research, among others, points at the gap between the open and distributed governance Bitcoin envisions 
and problems in its design. Seeing a means of payment as an infrastructure embedded into our daily lives, 
and the imperative availability it entails, the development of a sustainable governance will be pivotal for it 
to prevail and has yet to be found. In a similar vein, it remains of interest to explore how blockchain 
technology will be utilized and governed in inter-organizational settings on the long-term. Governance 
issues manifest themselves in practice. Hence, comparing a project’s aspired governance to the way it 
develops when operational promises detail about misconceptions. It further remains an open question, 
how data quality in terms of input and preservation can be ensured, especially when state participation is 
considered, and if efficiency gains can be realized or if those are deprived by additional cost of 
supervision. Finally, it remains of highest interest to compare different blockchain systems referring to 
the same governance archetype to ground blockchain’s impacts on those in more evidence. While we have 
seen in our research blockchains to allow for novel ways of enacting certain governance functions, it 
remains to be seen, if the archetype typology requires reconsideration. 
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